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ABSTRACT
Over the last decades, technological innovation became the new mantra in the Science, 
Technology, and Innovation (STI) policy arena of the most different countries, including 
the world peripheries. By adopting a historical and global perspective, we identify in this 
article a scope of isomorphic pressures in the core elements of the policy process, which 
became increasingly evident, aligned with neoliberalism and the ideals of rationalization 
and bureaucratization: discursive and argumentative rationalities, primary goals definition, 
policy mechanisms, and legislation – all elements central to policy formulation and very 
similar across countries, independently of some degree of variation within national contexts. 
Therefore, one can observe that the reforms held in the STI policy arena of different Latin 
America and Iberian countries, to create an ‘innovation culture’ of entrepreneurship, are 
based on very similar discourses and incentives. In this piece, we conduct a conceptual 
discussion on the politics of STI given the realities and historical backgrounds of some 
peripheral countries – mainly Latin American ones, highlighting the relations between 
interests and their respective agency within STI’s complex policy process.
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Several political events and the economic environment 
from the very 1970s onward created changes and cyclical 
pressures in favor of a common set of rationalities that began 
to influence the ‘discursive space’ of Science and Technology 
(S&T) policies.[1,2] Encouraged by the Japanese case and the 
predominance of economic culture, the orientation of the 
S&T policy in many countries began to place “emphasis on 
industrial innovation and technological forecasting”.[3] It 
has been a pervasive trend in most national science policy 
cases from the 1980s/1990s, increasingly assumed within the 
European integration and particularly during the transition 
to the 2000s.[4,5] Since their European accession, it has 
become notorious in cases like Spain and Portugal, at least 
from the transition to the 1990s. In Latin America, with the 
usual lapse of time, the situation was quite similar.[6] Despite 
some counter-hegemonic perspectives,[7] technological 
innovation became the prior goal of different public policies. 
The Brazilian ‘inovationism’[8] regarding the S&T policy 
orientation is a prime example of this generalized trend in the 
geopolitical Southern. This interpretation was increasingly 
legitimized by OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development) recommendations from the 
early 1990s, by acknowledging and favoring policy trends 
that intended to improve the innovation environment in 
the private sector – i.e., tax incentives, improving access 
to Research and Development (R&D) results, promoting 
technologies developed in university and public laboratories, 
with federal support, and the flexibilization of some antitrust 
laws to facilitate the establishment of R&D consortia among 
firms.[9]
By adopting a global and historical perspective, it is worth 
noting that this new mantra of technological imperatives 
and innovation coincided with the changes, incredibly 
perceptive from the 1980s onwards, in the dominant view 
around the state’s role,[10] which had been previously the 
model of rationality (e.g., Weber, Foucault). One key issue in 
the ‘new economic theory,’ as well as in some public policy 
theories, was a bruising criticism against the state’s role as the 
organizational agent of society. Neoliberalism emerged of 
this process based on a profound distrust against the state’s 
ability to steer the economy and society. From this moment, 
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gained prominence a view that the state should seek to 
increase public activities’ efficiency in terms of performance 
and satisfaction of the citizen-customer. The reforms resulting 
from this kind of thought had substantial repercussions in the 
Science, Technology, and Innovation (STI) policy arenas, 
including a significant impact on contemporary science’s 
social contract.[11] Amid neoliberal rationales, the state and its 
institutions needed to prove their worth and the ‘utility’ of 
public spending. Within the scientific and technological 
public system, agencies and research institutions are required, 
from this moment, to show the productivity of ‘useful 
science’.[12]
These changes in the dominant rationality of the state’s 
role were not inconsistent with theoretical accounts that 
were gaining strength in S&T policies. We concur with 
the literature that pointed out how S&T policies were 
clearly in tune and supportive of those trends. Naturally, 
technological imperatives and innovation’s economic bias 
was understandably attractive to scientists from some areas, 
especially those dedicated to generating new technologies 
and working collaboratively with private companies. It is a 
historical trend and permanence, from the second half of the 
20th century, the ‘co-evolution’ of influential actors, binding 
academic science, industry interests and goals, and the political 
renewal of leaderships – all playing the same semantics on the 
purpose of promoting technological innovation.[1]
Over the last decades, science policy specialists were 
engaged in performative discourses and theoretical 
frameworks pointing towards technological change and 
innovation. Being simultaneously experts and actors, 
they have suggested a new knowledge organization 
while participating in its realization.[13] The majority of 
theoretical accounts have indicated innovation’s virtues,[14] 
adopting what recent literature has been recognizing as a 
pro-innovation bias.[15] Several frameworks have been 
produced, most of them engaged in explaining (and 
extrapolating) trends of scientific systems allegedly in 
transformation, and mostly promoted by performative 
experts. Betting in change as a strategy (instead of tradition), 
specially ‘technological change’ is viewed as supposedly 
inexorable. Today, some of those frameworks came to be 
looked upon as authentic models. They came to be used by 
scholars, practitioners, and politicians to give a theoretical 
authority to political orientation.[1] 
1.  One of those models that came to be widely used within STI policy circles was 
the ‘national innovation system’.[17] The ‘systemic approach’ was already present 
in the OECD policy culture from the 1960s, namely through Christopher Free-
man (1921-2010) collaboration in this international organization. The concept of 
‘national innovation system’ (NIS), on his hand, came to spread later, from Lun-
dvall[18] and Edquist[19] works passing by Nelson[20] – and not forgetting Nelson 
and Rosenberg.[21] One must get that the NIS is just one of the many frameworks 
and models[22] that influenced national science policies.[14] It is remarkable the 
Indeed, in the context of STI, one might argue that the 
purpose of models is then to influence political circles. As a set 
of generalizations and perceptions around a process, models 
serve purposes and have implications. From a historical 
perspective, a model is both a narrative about the origins and 
history of ‘modern science policy’ and a set of frameworks 
– erected as policy models – aligned with the technocratic 
concept of STI policy[16] emergent after II world war and 
increasingly hegemonic up to our days. Within those S&T 
policy models, one can observe several concepts that, in 
interaction with each other, provide certain rationality – 
e.g., coordination, basic science, applied science, and many 
different categories that came to be instrumental for policy 
formulation in this area since a half-century ago. In the 
policy arena, a model is increasingly supported by codified 
discourses[26,27] and frameworks,[22] which by itself reinforces 
a process of homogenization (e.g., ‘isomorphism,’ among 
others).
Already underway, this isomorphism has been having a real 
impact in STI policy, by affecting the structures (institutions) 
and behaviors (actors), influencing and playing a central role 
in the construction and development of national science 
policies across several countries and regions – even if one 
acknowledges that the system’s shape and its outcomes depend 
on national contexts and domestic idiosyncrasies. Like this, 
mimicking discourses and practices, following and supporting 
patterns, the practices considered successful elsewhere have 
been (and still are being) consistently spread through the 
entire organizational field, including STI institutional and 
policy practices.[28] 
Once briefly introduced this discussion, the objective of 
this article is to reflect on and problematize to what extent 
we can say there is an ongoing process of ‘isomorphism’ in 
the STI policy process in terms of ‘strategic thought’ and 
‘policy practices’, within several Latin American and Iberian 
countries. Mainly following a historical and global perspective 
on the subject, to tackle this essentially conceptual discussion, 
the article looks at STI policies as a political process in the so-
called geopolitical South. This account is based on a literature 
review that includes empirical evidence published in earlier 
works of the authors, accumulated over some years of thought, 
teaching, and scholarly production concerned with Brazil and 
Portugal cases, as well as additional data gathered from other 
role that some concepts came to assume within the STI historical process. Frame-
works and models like the ‘production of knowledge’ and the ‘triple helix’,[23,24] 
both inspired by the “Mode 2” discourse,[25] that coexisted or even combined with 
the ‘systems of innovation’ approach. Highly influential in peripheral countries, 
the NIS approach was developed within the evolutionary economics and became 
enormously influential in international bodies and the European Union. The 
implicit intent of many of those models was thus precisely to be influential among 
policy circles. All these models’ explicit aim was to introduce a pro-innovation 
view, with emphasis in its economic potential.
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Latin American countries. In order to address the discussion of 
this piece, the article will be structured as follows. The second 
section revolves around the implications of neoliberalism in 
terms of its deconstruction of previous thinking regarding the 
state’s authority and managerial expertise. The third section 
examines the historical background of peripheral2 countries, 
based on discursive analysis and literature review, providing 
several examples of ongoing isomorphic pressures, the general 
adoption of technocratic and economically biased narrative, 
and a pro-innovation pattern independently of political 
ideologies. Then, the fourth and final section summarizes the 
main considerations on the extension and implications of the 
historical and systemic pressures that seem to shape policies in 
the STI field.
NEOLIBERALISM, THE DECONSTRUCTION OF 
STATE, AND THE MANEGERIAL MANTRA
Neoliberalism as a ‘collective thought’[33] and ideological 
mantra had a tremendous impact on modern science’s social 
contract, moulding the policy arena, refining the technocratic 
concept of science policy and its practices, based on economic 
planning techniques and biased towards a managerial 
perspective. Related to this, from the 1970s onward, a view 
arguing to increase the efficiency of public activities gained 
prominence. These changes regarding the state’s role took 
shape including practices of business management.[98] The 
neoliberal philosophy and the paradigms of global governance 
were behind the so-called ‘New Public Management,’ a new 
set of guidelines and principles, or a set of “doctrines of public 
accountability and organizational best practice”.[34] That is the 
emergence of ‘best practices’ as a management mantra[35] and 
as ‘the way’ to rationalize public spending. As an emerging 
discourse, this was part of a process of deconstructing the 
Weberian state – the bureaucratic state, a manifestation of the 
rational spirit as a means to control the nation, the previous 
paradigm of rationality now openly challenged by private and 
corporate interests.
Disbelief in the state’s role as an organizing agent of society, 
which is the core of the neoliberal ideology, and the reforms 
made as a result of that thinking, had substantial repercussions 
in the S&T area, significantly contributing to the development 
of a ‘new innovation policy.’ In the wake of neoliberalism, the 
state and its institutions needed to prove their worth and the 
‘usefulness’ of their expenses. After that, within the scientific 
system, the public funding agencies and research institutions 
needed to show that they were producing ‘useful science’[12] 
2. The framework ‘center-periphery’ appeared in Latin America in the 1940s 
based on recognition of the ‘uneven and combined nature of development’ (e.g., 
Trotsky) in Western capitalist evolution and how it impacted the development of 
Latin American economies. For further reading on this debate, see Prebisch,[29] 
Furtado,[30] among others. Concerning other uses of ‘center-periphery’ frame-
works, see Singer[31] and Shils.[32]
– or socially relevant, depending on the political quadrant. 
Utility was more and more justified in terms of economic 
growth, and in our societies innovation came to be seen 
mainly as ‘technological change’.
Innovation is immersed in different political quadrants, and 
in several countries, being perceived as socially and culturally 
desirable, an emblem of novelty and original creation. Even 
in the political milieus of peripheral countries, innovation has 
been contrasted to conservative forces’ desiderata, almost as a 
‘myth for reformism’ – for example, in economic corporatist 
regimes like Portugal and Spain before the 1970s. Though, 
a more practical view of innovation (‘as technical change’) 
emerged in Western societies, being quasi-hegemonic 
nowadays – at least from the last half of the twentieth century 
– inspired by historical experiences of technological success, 
like Japan or South Korea. 
With Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter consider as their 
founding father, many experts came to defend the role that 
innovation should occupy in economics, such as within the 
‘new growth theory,’ an argument that convinced not just 
the neoliberals but also leftist and utopian milieus. For the 
neoliberals, innovation is often seen as being close to the ideals 
of free enterprise and entrepreneurship within the conception 
that innovation would be almost a natural consequence of a 
system of incentives and penalties established due to market 
liberalization. For social reformists and utopian quadrants, 
innovation is synonymous of freedom and original creation 
and a force against tradition and conservatism.[36]
Later over the 2000s, even with the growing frustration 
regarding the results of neoliberal policies,[37] innovation 
continued to maintain its positive connotation, making it 
a goal to be achieved through the adoption of active public 
policies. Even within the most radical economic liberalism, 
it was impossible to completely delegate the production 
of scientific knowledge to the private sector. So under the 
aegis of neoliberalism, the biggest supporter of research and 
development (R&D) remains the state, although the ‘market’ 
ought to determine its direction.
The role of new technologies to increase profits became a 
case for the idea of companies to engage in technological 
development, which came to be seen as the critical variable 
in evolutionist growth models. Accordingly, to those new 
theoretical accounts from economics, R&D’s expenditure 
becomes to be seen as promising to generate increasing 
returns for companies instead of the constant returns expected 
by previous economic theories, which only considered capital 
and labor as factors of production.[38,39] Following previous 
traditions of thought (e.g., M. Polanyi), additional theoretical 
accounts also brought forward the rhetoric of knowledge 
creation and the capacitation discourse, as new variables to 
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be considered within production factors and technological 
development.[40,41] With this overall effort to present S&T as 
the main engine of economic growth, the rationality came 
to be that the government should spend as much as possible 
in infrastructure to continually ensure the generation of new 
ideas, namely those that could lead to new products and 
processes. All in all, this kind of expenditures become justified 
based on successively new and increasingly prevailing 
economic theories.[42]
The fact is that, in the last decades, funding for STI have been 
integrated among the functions of a state that the neoliberals 
could not despise. Besides economic theories, the underlying 
reasoning is that innovation is presented itself as the ultimate 
output of science and technology activities, guaranteeing the 
appropriation of the technoscientific development undertaken 
within the public sector, in terms of economic outputs by 
companies. Even within the neoliberal logic, it is impossible 
to completely delegate to the private sector the production 
of scientific knowledge due to the market failures. So, under 
the aegis of neoliberalism, the biggest supporter of research 
activities remained the state, the ‘neoliberal state’,[43] even 
if who ought to determine their direction should be the ‘ 
market’.[8]
This change in the ideology of public affairs meant a pressure 
for further rationalization of public expenditure towards 
managerial and market criteria, within a ‘globalized neoliberal 
world,’ forcing an increasing similarity in the political 
organization among different countries around the world. 
This implied significant pressure towards a good measure of 
homogenization. These pressures are perceptive when one 
looks to historical processes, wherefrom a global standpoint, 
it is clear many isomorphic pressures that took place through 
policy transfer strategies – processes by which “knowledge 
about how policies, administrative arrangements, institutions 
and ideas in one political setting… is used in the development 
of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas 
in another political setting”,[44] involving not just policies per 
se, but also institutions, ideologies or justifications, attitudes 
and ideas.[45]
In our view, the existence of neoliberalism should not be 
viewed as a mere conflict of ideology but rather as one of 
the most significant developments in the history of Western 
political ideas, private governance, state government, and 
public administration. Neoliberal ideas had, and still have, 
palpable implications, moulding our increasingly globalized 
international system, or the rationales behind national public 
policies, including shaping a new paradigm of governance. 
Based on the ideas of thinkers like Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich 
A. von Hayek, Milton Friedman, and James Buchannan 
emerging from the years immediately following World 
War II, neoliberalism influenced both political philosophy 
and practice as a theoretical body of knowledge within the 
traditions of Western political thought. STI policy arena is 
neither more scientific than other public policy areas nor 
agnostic regarding our times’ zeitgeist.
FROM RATIONALIZATION TO 
HOMOGENIZATION – OR HOW STIP HAS BEEN 
HAPPENING IN THE WORLD PERIPHERY
Various policy analysts have always observed historical 
similarities between national S&T policies around the world. 
This process of policy homogenization has been characterized 
in different ways: extrapolation;[46] transfer of institutional 
models;[47] imitative institutional development;[48] model 
emulation;[49] ‘transduction’;[50] policy transfer;[44] mimetic 
translation[51] and so on. One way to explain these phenomena 
is to appeal to international and more systemic trends, which 
are: (1) the bureaucratization and rationalization process[27,52] 
within the public policy area, that was also underway and 
not exclusively to S&T field; and (2) the role of international 
organizations in shaping agendas and spreading policy 
concepts constructed as normative models to be replicated 
elsewhere.[53] 
Concerning the bureaucratization and rationalization process, 
it is a fact that the functioning of the state by itself demands a 
set of requirements – the budget cycle, procedures to organize 
the fiscal year, annual reports, financial reporting, and other 
requirements for contracts and funding. Thus, expansion of the 
state role supports, by itself, those trends to the standardization 
and homogenization of organizational models in the area. In 
this sense, the Science contract, from its beginnings, points 
to a rationalization process of both scientific practice and the 
state. Standardization and normalization were already within 
the organization of science purposes, as well as, later on, the 
evaluation for funding is going to shape the internal practices 
of scientific communities.
Regarding the role of international organizations, it is 
abundant evidence of its policy influence. It is known that 
from the 1960s, by convening with national governments, 
OECD was conducting exams on members national 
science policies, being behind several attempts to stabilize 
the administrative structure of the organization of science, 
increasingly envisioned as an ‘innovation system,’ based on 
a package of recommended measures to improve the climate 
for innovation  (essentially intended to stimulate R&D within 
the private sector). The OECD’s influence can be perceived 
in Latin America as well, mainly through his alliance with 
UNESCO and its systematic intervention altogether with the 
Organization of American States (OAS), materialized in the 
transfer of various policy mechanisms.[54,55] 
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As mentioned before, this inclination towards homogenization 
in a public policy area is not exclusive of S&T, being an object 
of analysis by different disciplines. Within the literature, there 
are several concepts concerning that kind of phenomenon in 
public policies. One of the most used is isomorphism, defined 
by DiMaggio and Powell[52] as a process of constraint that 
forces an entity or institution of a population to resemble other 
organizations facing the same set of conditions. According 
to the authors, this process results from the acceptance of 
the ideals of rationalization and bureaucratization originated 
from the ‘competitive market environment’ and transposed to 
neoliberalism’s public policy arena. Within the very basis of 
modernity as an idea of civilization, the ideal of rationality is 
always the best model to follow, pressuring organizations to 
‘adopt it.’
Isomorphic pressures – institutional and policy 
compliance
The literature related usually points to three interconnected 
isomorphic pressures by which change follows an isomorphic 
path: (i) coercive, stemming from political influence or 
addressing legitimacy problems; (ii) mimetic, which leads to the 
adoption of a standard approach in situations of uncertainty; 
and (iii) normative, related to the interests of the dominant 
players in the space of the public policy in question.[56] 
As McNeely[57] stresses, despite the varying conditions and 
characteristics –economic, social, historical, political and so 
on– ‘… countries have tended to develop similar institutional 
arrangements and activities in which institutionalized rules 
and normative prescriptions dictate how states act (or should) 
to achieve goals of progress and development within the 
international system’. As the basis of these mimesis forces, 
it is broadly accepted that international organizations have 
contributed to developing ‘increasingly codified conceptions of 
science’.[27] Increasingly “modernized” and integrated, the 
global system generates institutional forms and practices that 
spread throughout it to the extent that virtually all nation-
states enact the wider system’s structures in their pursuit of 
progress’.[57]
One example is the worldwide funding of Ministries of 
Science and Technology;[58] another one is the creation of 
national agencies of science, which comprehended at least 
two generations: a first one devoted to the promotion of 
science and the second one, from the 1960s onwards, based 
on the myth of coordination.[35] In the Iberian countries, as 
in Latin American ones, with a very clear strategy of political 
coordination of the national production, some initiatives had 
been set in motion. For example, in Portugal, the setting up of 
JNICT – Junta Nacional de Investigação Científica e Tecnológica 
(the National Board for Scientific and Technological Research) 
in 1967, occurred as part of a long-term policy to prepare the 
Portuguese economy for open competition. It is discernible 
the same kind of coordination agencies (sometimes the reform 
of previous bodies) in Spain and across several Latin American 
countries.
Despite some lag in Latin America, the post IIWW brought 
the first science agencies in the region, as the CNPq (1951) in 
Brazil and the CNICyT (1951) in Argentina, both oriented 
towards granting fellowships and subsides to scientists. 
However, over the years, reforms tended to shape those 
agencies to become coordination bodies and adopt the so-
called system perspective, very characteristic of the technocratic 
elite, which aimed at a systemic articulation between scientific 
and technical institutions, including the coordination with 
other interests for the national development project. 
As early as 1964, CNPq was assigned the role of defining 
Brazilian national STIP, promoting planning exercises, and 
encouraging collaboration with the industrial sector.[59] In 
Argentina, the creation of CONICET in 1958 (dissolving 
CNICyT) maintained the previous profile for scientific 
community corporate representation, but additional reforms 
would also try to assign this agency a coordination function. 
Further, this assignment would be transferred to CONACyT, 
created in 1966.[60] Also common to several national cases, 
those agencies created or reconfigured to coordinate the 
respective national ‘system of science and technology’ would 
be derogated when national ministries of S&T were created.
This copying of organizational structures was in part due 
to international organizations influence next to national 
practitioners. For example, the OECD has engaged in 
constructing organized science narratives and the so-
demanded statistics that would serve as the leading indicators 
for the S&T policy area.[61] Additionally, experiments of 
technology forecasting and funding schemes for research 
by contract programs were also part of an international 
policy implementation trend. On his hand, the United 
Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) strongly influenced many countries, particularly 
peripheral underdeveloped nations including Latin America 
ones, recommending countries to build a ‘proper’ scientific 
infrastructure, contributing to the institutionalization process 
of STI policy, generating rationales within the logic of ‘how-
to’ handbooks and so on. Other international organizations[62] 
have played an important role in harmonizing these national 
science policies, including the Inter-American Bank of 
Development (IBD), with its loans to Latin American 
countries, which were implemented with ‘strings attached,’ as 
some authors have been studying it.[63,64]
Modalities of those isomorphic pressures may vary, including 
in their intensity. One way of homogenization is from coercive 
isomorphism pressures, which can be both informal or formal. It 
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can also be felt by force or persuasion, being subtler and less 
explicit. It usually is the case of some relations between national 
authorities and international entities, like the European Union, 
whose normative framework became increasingly binding to 
its members. It is also a ‘mechanism’ applied to the central 
state›s relation with subordinate departments and institutions.
The direct imposition of standard operating procedures and 
rules also happens from the governmental arena.[28]
One example is the ‘strings attached’ to the so-called 
Washington Consensus, a set of economic measures 
formulated in 1989 by a group of financial institutions such 
as the located in Washington (hence its name), like the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and 
the US Department of Treasury. Making these economic 
measures the official policy of the IMF in the 1990s, these 
financial institutions became involved in promoting 
macroeconomic adjustments in Latin America, contributing 
to shape institutional frameworks and policy formulation 
possibilities in several areas, including STI. The ‘prescription’ 
was composed of ten core rules, including (i) promote fiscal 
discipline, (ii) reduction of public spending, (iii) carrying 
out tax reform, (iv) regulate market interest and (v) foreign 
exchange, (vi) trade liberalization, (vii) promoting foreign 
direct investment, with the elimination of any barriers, (viii) 
privatization of state enterprises, (ix) economic and labour 
market deregulation and (x) creating a legal framework to 
guarantee respect for intellectual property. 
To obtain international loans, Latin American countries were 
indeed  forced to adopt, with immediate effect, the ‘international 
standard’ of intellectual property through internal judicial 
reforms.[65] Examples of adopting this ‘recommendation’ are 
the changes to the legal framework on intellectual property 
in the region’s countries since then, beginning with Chile 
(1992). For example: (a) Chile, law 19.166 (1992), changing 
the previous legislation of intellectual property; (b) Argentina, 
the law of the author’s rights n. 24.249 (1993); (c) México: 
creating an interministerial commission for the protection, 
surveillance, and safeguarding of intellectual property rights 
(1993); (d). Brazil, the law of intellectual property n. 9.279 
(1996).
Other examples of coercive isomorphism relate to European 
Union (EU) accession of sovereign states, particularly to small 
countries when dealing with the norms associated with the 
community funds. Allocated through a myriad of funding 
programmes, access to EU structural funds is set by well-
delimited procedural norms, such as the selection criteria and 
the implementation/ assessment of research contracts and 
projects. For some actors, the EU with its legal framework 
presents as a case of coercive isomorphism. Although if 
coercion can be debatable, normativism is running through 
the veins of EU framework funding programmes. Normative 
isomorphism is associated with professionalisation[28] – from 
which we may evoke Peter Haas’s[66] concept of ‘epistemic 
communities.’ In the case of Powell and Di Maggio,[28] one 
should understand “professionalization as a collective struggle 
of members of an occupation to define the conditions and 
methods of their work, to control ‘the production of producers’ 
… and to establish a cognitive base and legitimation for their 
occupational autonomy.” That is why historical studies stress 
the role of actors who participate in isomorphic practices to 
legitimize their social function. 
As for the policy mechanisms, despite the nuances in place, 
isomorphic pressures can lead to two kinds of conformity: (i) 
in terms of compliance (direction of movement – degree of 
change in the direction appointed by isomorphic pressures) 
and (ii) of convergence (resemblance – the extent to which 
the organisations in a field resemble each other) – being the 
first more frequent.[67] An overview of those instruments in 
the Latin American and Iberian countries is very enlightening 
concerning compliance (Table 1).
Regarding these policy instruments, summarily, the emphasis is 
on the financial mechanisms oriented to promote technological 
innovation – as concessional credits, reimbursable funds with 
subsidized interest rates, direct subvention, and concession 
non-refundable resources and tax incentives. These types of 
financial mechanisms emerged earlier in public policy history, 
along with the creation of various scientific and technological 
institutions, and even since World War I. For example, 
concerning concessional credit, along with OECD countries 
as France (since 1974 through Sofinnova Ventures3) and 
Japan (implemented by Japan Small and Medium Enterprise 
Corporation – Jasmec,4 established in 1980), several Latin 
American countries use similar mechanisms. Brazil, by the 
Financiadora de Estudos e Projetos – Finep,5 Brazilian Innovation 
Agency, established in 1967, acting more actively from the 
1980s). As well as Argentina (Fondo Tecnológico Argentino – 
FONTAR,6 the Argentine Technological Agency, created 
in 1996), Chile (Corporación de Fomento de la Producción – 
CORFO,7 an agency oriented to promote a business sector, 
established in 1939 and reoriented to development and 
innovation since the 1990s) and Venezuela (Fondo Nacional 
de Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación – FONACIT, created in 
1967, abolished in 1984 and recreated in 1985 – responsible 
for the management and control of the financing of plans, 
programs, projects and activities in the field8). To mention 
just some examples of agencies that offer different options of 
concessional credit to technological modernization. 
This modality of funding, oriented towards projects 
considered of low risk, is the most ancient and basic one, 
emerging in Latin America and other peripheral regions since 
the post-war alongside the creation of various scientific and 
technological institutions, following the guidance and support 
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of multilateral organizations such as UNESCO, OECD and 
the Organization of American States (OAS). The similarity 
of orientation and strategy in the quest to mobilize financing 
sources to promote technological innovation becomes 
evident when one compares the countries’ innovation policy 
instruments, as unveiled by Table 1. Except for El Salvador 
and Honduras, all the other countries included in the study 
have some instruments for promoting innovation and 
competitiveness in enterprises. Altogether, there are dozens 
of instruments, with the Southern Cone countries with more 
variety of these devices. It is worth noting that Argentine, 
Brazil, Spain, Peru, Portugal and Uruguay have the same set 
of financial instruments, with at least one mechanism in each 
of the categories analyzed. 
Concerning the institutional systems (convergence), all 23 
Iberoamerican countries analyzed tend to follow a consistent 
pattern. All of them count with a sound legal framework build 
on ‘national innovation system’ narratives, which consistently 
adopted a pro-innovation discourse. Even historically, 
most of the countries followed trajectories that reveal more 
convergence than divergence. For example, almost all 
national cases created funding agencies since earlier (e.g., 
Spain, Argentina, Portugal) or after the Second World War 
(e.g., Brazil and others). After a while, a second generation of 
funding agencies for STI was created, aiming to coordinate 
S&T institutions and provide political and scientific advice to 
governments. The emergence and dissemination of ‘Ministries 
of Science’ meant to strengthen the political tutelage over 
STI, arguing for more generous funding. This political 
umbrella for STI came to empty those previous Coordination 
and Advisory bodies from their initial mission concerning 
Policy-setting and guidelines, which came to be performed 
by Ministries or States Secretariats.
There are, of course, some nuances here and even 
competing models regarding the organization of science 
establishments.[53,69,70] Since early, though, most relevant 
Table 1: Comparative analysis of policy instruments.
Country
Funds promoting 
innovation and business 
competitiveness
Venture capital, seed 
capital, and other financial 




and scholars in business
Clusters promotion 
mechanisms, technology 
centers and business 
incubators
Argentina √ √ √ √
Bolivia √ √
Brazil √ √ √ √
Chile √ √ √
Colombia √ √ √








México √ √ √
Nicaragua √ √
Panamá √ √ √
Paraguay √ √
Peru √ √ √ √
Portugal √ √ √ √
Dominican Republic √ √
Trinidad y Tobago √ √
Uruguay √ √ √ √
Venezuela √ √
Source: Prepared by the authors based on data collected on the Report of Policy Instruments, by the RICYT – Ibero-American and Inter-American Network of 
Science and Technology Indicators, MEyC[68] and the Portuguese National Innovation Agency (ANI).1 Obs.: It is worth mentioning that among RICYT’s objectives 
are the systematization of national STI metrics and the design of specific indicators for STI measurement in Ibero American countries.2
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players in the region created funding agencies, and some 
of them are already historical institutions (e.g., JAE | CSIC-
Spain, CONICET-Argentina, CNPq-Brazil, Capes-Brazil, 
JEN-Portugal, JNICT | FCT-Portugal, among others). There 
is also a pattern of solutions to deal with funding demands, 
most of them trying different organizational solutions and 
funding schemes, but following a shared repertoire of policy 
arrangements, from the traditional science state agency to 
national funds, including the detachment from or newly 
created agencies designed explicitly for applied research, 
technology, and innovative activities (as Finep-Brazil and 
ANI-Portugal, for example).
If there is a wide variety of institutional arrangements, from 
ministries to national councils, and a certain degree of variation 
according to the different cultures and groups participating 
in the national S&T effort, there is no doubt a consistent 
trajectory of isomorphic practices regarding the institutional 
Table 2: Comparative analysis of institutional systems.
Country Legal framework (i)
Policy-setting body and 




for STI activities (iv)
R&D executing 
bodies (v)
Argentina √ √ √ √ √
Bolivia √ √ √ √
Brazil √ √ √ √ √
Chile √ √ √ √
Colombia √ √ √ √ √
Costa Rica √ √ √ √
Cuba √ √ √
Ecuador √ √ √
El Salvador √ √ √ √
Spain √ √ √ √ √
Guatemala √ √ √ √ √
Honduras √ √ √ √
Jamaica √ √ √ √
México √ √ √ √ √
Nicaragua √ √ √ √
Panamá √ √ √ √ √
Paraguay √ √ √ √
Peru √ √ √
Portugal (vi) √ √ √ √ √
Dominican Republic √ √ √ √
Trinidad y Tobago √ √ √ √
Uruguay √ √ √ √ √
Venezuela √ √ √ √
Source: Prepared by the authors based on data collected on the Institutional Systems Report by the RICYT – Ibero-American and Inter-American Network of Science 
and Technology Indicators. Available at: http://bd.politicascti.net/report_SI.php/politicas/all/all/all/es.
Notes:
(i) This includes legislation establishing the National System of Innovation, consecrating at a national level both the system perspective for the ST&I activities and 
the adoption of the pro-innovation bias.
(ii) Encompasses Ministries, Vice-Ministries, National Secretariats, Administrative Departments, and even Advisory Councils.
(iii) Includes not just Coordination Bodies, but also Assessment Councils.
(iv) Funding bodies cover different historical generations of agencies supporting S&T activities, including agencies designed to apply technologies and innovative 
activities.
(v) This includes a variety of public institutes and state laboratories doing S&T activities.
(vi) Portugal was filled based on Brandão,[35,71] Rollo et al. 2018,[70] Henriques 2006,[72] and Heitor and Horta 2004,[73] including resources from the Portuguese 
Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT) and the Portuguese National Innovation Agency (ANI).
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by the international diffusion of conceptual policy tools and 
thought models (i.e., frameworks). This process entails a 
modus operandi based on a mimetic thought process that has 
conditioned STIP evolution in peripheral regions.
One of the most important Latin American thinkers in S&T 
matters, the argentine Jorge A. Sabato, argued since the 
1960s that these countries could be just as capable as others 
of doing science and developing technology, embracing 
innovation’s values as a tool to bridge the gap with the 
North.[75] It was a counter-hegemonic view in its context, but 
the condition then was that S&T was seen as the right path to 
breakthrough economic (and political) dependence, overcome 
underdevelopment. Since then, national governments in the 
geopolitical South began to see the potential of science to 
fulfil a dual role: on the one hand, to solve the most urgent 
practical problems arising from the underdeveloped condition; 
on the other hand, to publicly promote S&T to bridge the 
gap with the North and give governments the appearance of 
modernizing.[76] 
Simultaneously, though, the challenge from these historical 
S&T thinkers was also sensitive to the degree of this imitation 
and further implications that could arise concerning the right 
way to adopt those external technoscientific cultures. As 
perceived by Spanish Nobel Prize from our history unsung 
heroes, Cajal[77] “It was ignored that only the ideas are fruitful. 
And looking for recipes and formulas of action is the cause 
of atrophy in the wings of the spirit, incapacitating men for 
great inventions”. Another argentine, Oscar Varsavsky,[78] 
stress that the high degree of cultural dependence in the 
peripheral countries is remarkable, arguing though that these 
countries should import (or “feel” the constraint to copy) not 
just the goods produced but also the methods, without which 
they would continue underdeveloped.[78] Indeed, the political 
stance of following ‘exemplary’ countries has historical 
roots in Latin America, but the strategic dimension of STIP 
was fully understood. Furthermore, a perspective on the 
implications of a globalized development model was framed 
by a historical perception regarding peripheral countries’ 
political economy. Receiving great awareness in the past by 
historians, sociologists, and economists over the years, this 
political economy entanglements were even the focus of 
a United Nations agency, the Economic Commission for 
Latin America (ECLA), in 1948. ECLA was an international 
organization where a ‘post-colonial’ awareness was raised 
concerning several economies’ dependent position on those in 
the geopolitical North. A strategy of economic development 
‘catch up’ was the focus of several Latin American economists 
(e.g., Raúl Prebisch, Celso Furtado, and others), whose 
accounts provided the theoretical basis for an industrial 
strategy followed throughout the 1950s and 1960s, before 
system (Table 2). Not just every country have a similar legal 
framework towards innovation; as over past decades, most 
of them have created a political body for policy-setting 
and guidelines. They all have a political coordination (and 
advisory) body in STI, including Chile that historically had a 
decentralized institutional configuration. Besides CONICYT 
created in 1968, other instances had huge autonomy, like the 
Program Chile-IDB, CORFO-Ministry of Economy or the 
Consejo Nacional de Innovación para la Competitividad, created 
in 2007. In 2018, Chile finally created a Ministry of Science, 
Technology, Knowledge and Innovation (MICITEC9) and, in 
2020, set up a National Agency for Research and Development 
(ANID10) integrating the 52 years old CONICYT, which 
never assumed the role of coordinating the Chilean S&T 
system. 
Another strong trend in STI policy formulation is that from 
the very beginning, the definition of a national science 
policy passed through the identification of strategic areas, 
in particular when coordination agencies and new funding 
arrangements emerged during the 1960s, assuming the task of 
reorganizing the national scientific and technological research 
establishments. Since then, scientific and technological 
clusters were being successively replicated around areas 
like Agriculture, Public Works, Nuclear Energy, Outer 
Space, Oceanography, Environment, Biotechnology, 
Nanotechnology, etcetera. At last, most (18 of 23 countries) 
presents scientific and technical institutions, some of them 
based on local research traditions, promoting and doing R&D 
activities. However, R&D executing bodies are mostly public 
institutes and state laboratories on technical and technoscience 
fields but also following fashionable labels of their respective 
time – labels that were being promoted over more than a half-
century, even when it was not possible to find a critical mass or 
research schools within the respective scientific communities.
In short, despite some degree of variance or specificity was 
already predicted by some authors that wrote on isomorphic 
pressures, this debate on the global isomorphic process is 
indeed enlightening to understand that we should adopt a 
macro view on the national STIP, not just a microanalysis 
from case studies and policy programs and mechanisms.
The political discourses – convergence with a pro-
innovation pattern
As we have pointed, almost all Latin America countries, 
from the relatively industrialized to the less developed, seem 
to embrace a set of organizational structures and policy 
mechanisms to foster technological innovation and target 
R&D funding.[74] However, more than policy instruments 
and mechanisms is at stake. This process of rationalization and 
homogenization carries broad implications, not just in terms 
of ‘policy practices’ but also of a ‘strategic thought’ supported 
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new generation of S&T managers, the so-called technocrats, 
were responsible for rehabilitating previous science agencies. 
By reforming them in modern techno-bureaucracies, that 
came to centralize the management of research funding, 
competing with and even absorbing previous science policy 
agencies from the first half of the XXth century.[82]
For instance, when looking at Portugal’s second historical 
OECD exercise (1981-1986), already in the Democratic 
period, we can say that those international organisations were 
instrumental at least since the 1960s. In getting the attention 
of political circles, this kind of international activity was 
explicitly intended to the enrichment of existing knowledge on 
the content of science policy. So, to understand how this evolves, 
in the Iberian countries, one could look at the emergence of 
certain discourses from a group of economists and engineers 
who have been the predominant elite in the political process 
of defining and implementing STI policies.[81] Following 
these discourses, emerging between the 1960s and 1980s, 
is observable the increasing predominance of a techno-
bureaucratic culture to manage S&T resources and STI policy.
If one looks to the European Union accession of Portugal 
and Spain, and still nowadays, we are learning in the last 
decades that that process has meant not only quantitative 
but also qualitative implications for ‘national science 
policy’.[53] The ‘Europeanization’ of STI policy had theoretical 
and practical substance, consisting of following a particular STI 
policy vision. The launch of many EU funding programmes 
supporting R&D imposed a growing specialisation among 
its stakeholders in the public administration and scientific 
institutions. It strengthened the bureaucratic culture, which 
had been growing since the 1960s but was supported by the 
influence of community funds from the 1980s and 1990s.
On his side, the content of STI political discourses in Latin 
American countries can be observed in the national plans 
and legislation, as important mechanisms of regulation and 
behaviour shaping searching for emulated ‘best practices.’ 
Examples we find in the reforms held in the STI policy 
framework of different Latin American countries, to create 
an ‘innovation culture’ in the entrepreneurial ranks, based on 
very similar discourses and incentives from one country to 
another. In that discursive arena, STI national plans allege that 
“There is a consensus in the Academy, in the Government and 
society that... the generation of wealth, employment, income 
and opportunities, with the product diversification and the 
increase of the added value in the production of goods and 
services, depends directly on the strengthening of country’s 
research and innovation capacities”;[83] “…scientific research, 
technological development and innovation are [considered] 
essential precursors of competitiveness and economic growth; 
therefore, they require a strong boost, promoting collaborative 
the model of global imperatives came to shape the political 
economy of present times in many of these countries. 
Nonetheless, if one looks at more recent STI political discourses, 
it seems that these concerns had disappeared. Although 
pressures to adopt hegemonic and mainstream’s perspectives 
can be seen everywhere in national plans and legislation. 
Today, those official documents became essential mechanisms 
of regulation and shaping behaviour. For example, among 
several national plans across Latin America, the Brazilian 
National Strategy on Science, Technology, and Innovation, for the 
period 2012 to 2015, while specifying differences in emphasis 
and focus, recognizes the similarities in national policies’ 
guidelines across countries, acknowledging that...
‘…the national plans and strategies for science, technology 
and innovation in developed countries… as well as in key 
emerging countries, are generally similar. Strengthening 
business innovation in order to increase industrial 
competitiveness remains a common goal, especially in terms 
of raising productivity, employment growth and improve 
quality of life…’[79]
Equally symptomatic, the elaboration process of the Argentine 
ST&I national plan started with a “review of national and 
international antecedents,” including “analysis of the recent 
experiences of planning in the selected countries,” mainly in 
the “national science and technology plans”.[79] Furthermore, 
as another example, the Mexican Plan has, as among one 
of its specific goals, “strengthen bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation with international organizations to exchange 
knowledge, methodologies and best practices”.[80]
In Latin American countries, the aforementioned international 
institutions’ strategy to influence the STI policy was based 
on two major components. On the one hand, a political one 
through periodic meetings of the National Councils leaders 
for Science and Technology Policy of the countries of the 
region. On the other, a technical or project execution one, 
involving more specific transfer activities as advisory services, 
training of local personnel, financing of studies on specific 
STIP topics and organization of technical meetings to share 
the progress made.[64,53]11 
Indeed, understanding the paths of the Latin American and 
Iberian countries STI policy requires an understanding of the 
emergence of particular discourses, with the related concepts 
and argumentation – i.e., the technocratic concepts, conveyed 
by a group of economists and engineers.[81] The building of 
professional and epistemic communities in the STI area is 
visible in national cases since the 1960s, shaping the language, 
the concepts and the views that characterize the political process 
of defining and implementing STI on the eve of European 
accession, by following certain technocratic discourses and 
concepts disseminated by the OECD international jargon, a 
S15 Journal of Scientometric Research, Vol 10, Issue 1 [Special Issue], Jan-Apr 2021
Bagattolli and Brandão: Contesting STIP Mainstream Narrative
As pointed out earlier, evidence of this shaping of ‘strategic 
thought’ in policy discourses is a central feature in the 
current STI political process, most remarkable across different 
political forces: the policy of recourse to (or reliance on) 
models, to produce innovative outcomes.[92] The mimetic 
thought process involves searching for models,[28] which follows 
a pro-innovation bias in the case of STIP. With considerable 
overlap in these modelling recommendations for S&T 
governance, multiple frameworks gained ground over the 
1980s and 1990s. The ‘systemic’ approach, in general, became 
enormously influential within the OECD umbrella from the 
1960s onward and in the EU and Latin American countries 
gained significant momentum over the 1990s and 2000s. 
For example, the ‘national innovation system,’ cyclically 
benefiting from influential inputs promoted by Anglo-
Saxon[25] and Scandinavian gurus[18] or the ‘triple helix’,[23] 
being the most widely diffused of the conceptualizations 
crafted for policy modelling. All the Latin America countries 
organizing national S&T adopted this systemic approach and 
the technocratic language that goes with it. 
As early as 1972, the ‘National System of Science and 
Technology’ was legally instituted in Brazil. Even in 
Venezuela over Chavismo years, most of the STI jargon used 
by the ‘Ministry for Popular Power in Science, Technology 
and Innovation’ is pretty much aligned with technocratic 
narratives, replacing ‘economic appropriation of S&T’ 
with the ‘social appropriation’ of S&T and Innovation.[90] 
This socialist model adopted a discourse of participated and 
‘useful Science’ but just replacing ‘the market’ with a ‘for the 
People’ clause.[91] It is even remarkable how even with leftists’ 
governments in the region (including the case of Cuba, if 
one looks at the description of Sáenz Sánchez 2000,[93] the 
understanding of innovation as ‘technological change’ follows 
the same technocratic and pro-innovation pattern.[94] When 
there is mention of social and inclusive innovation, it is just 
residual - e.g., Brazilian policy programs from Lulismo years 
on Social Technology got very mild support.
Regarding this technobureaucratic and economically biased 
culture, we can say that, from the 1970s and 1980s, which 
were transitional years in many regards, it is even possible to 
see the gradual emergence of a consensus among new scientific 
leaders, seeking to take advantage of international funding 
opportunities. During the first stage of EU integration, for 
example, there was indeed visible effort to reconceptualize 
problems concerning STI policy by the stakeholders involved, 
from the more academic to official discourses suggesting 
reconfiguration of the ‘scientific system’ into an ‘innovation 
system.’ It was the case in the Iberian nations’ transition to 
democracy during the 1980s. There were similar trends within 
other peripheral contexts. The STI policy began to merge and 
reshape into a policy for applied imperatives. Under the aegis 
links between scientists, technologists, academics and 
industrialists”.[84]
In being so, national governments are engaged in “...deepen 
this action in the coming years and create the conditions for 
science, technology and innovation to be the driving force 
behind a qualitative leap in terms of social and economic 
development and social inclusion ...to respond to the 
challenges of the present and make real the opportunities that 
knowledge offers towards the construction of a more just 
and thriving country”.[85] In this sense, one should consider 
innovation as “...a means and a process. It is a means to expand 
productivity, possibilities and solutions to achieve a different 
and better development than we have today. Moreover, it is a 
process since its continuous application is required to generate 
results. Companies and institutions need to develop a muscle, 
routines, and innovation culture for it to really happen. 
They must make innovation part of the companies’ business, 
which is an iterative process of trial and error, of permanent 
testing”.[86] Narratives like these can be found even in Latin 
American countries with different political perspectives, 
like Venezuela, where it is defended the need of national 
government “To promote the effective contribution of 
science, technology, innovation and their applications to the 
development and strengthening of production with a high 
level of Venezuelan added value that strengthens our national 
sovereignty”.[87] “Current industrial development involves 
an aggressive policy of induction of technical change at 
the company scale, a process that must be accompanied by 
support and induction policies from the State through the 
instrumentation of mechanisms such as R&D, creation of 
incentives for innovation, the flexibility of transfer processes, 
among others, so that the company-state relationship must be 
very close”.[88] Analogous in Cuba’ documents, innovation is 
approached altogether with productive strategies to “Achieve 
higher levels of productivity and efficiency in all sectors of 
the economy by increasing the impact of science, technology 
and innovation on economic and social development, as well 
as the adoption of new patterns of use of productive factors, 
management models and organisation of production”.[89]
Nevertheless, despite discursive and rhetorical promises, 
technological sovereignty and productive transformation are 
still a mirage for these countries. For Venezuela, for instance, 
despite the unprecedented amount of resources allocated 
to STI in recent years (e.g., reached 2,0-2,5% GERD in 
2003-2008), economic diversification, dependence on the 
oil industry, reliance on foreign technology, etcetera, did 
not change (when it did not get worse).[90,91] Not just S&T 
‘endogenisation’ is still a dream; there are serious signs that 
scientific standards were not sufficiently grounded, and 
infrastructure is already deteriorated by neglecting policies, 
including the ones designed in the name of innovation.
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the structures (institutions and policies) and behaviours (actors 
and discourses) regarding national STIP. 
At the same time - although it is not the focus of this article-, 
we could unveil some nuances in the STIP process of those 
peripheral national cases. When looking at the conformity of 
STIP in Iberoamerica, the impact of isomorphic pressures 
tends to be more assertive on organizational strategies and 
culture than on structures and instruments. As the literature 
acknowledges, this means the impact regarding the adoption 
of the mainstream best practices in the national STIPs are 
more evident in terms of compliance (organizations movement 
in the direction consistent with isomorphic pressures) than in 
terms of convergence (the extent to which all organizations in a 
field resemble each other more closely over time) – which can 
happen with or without compliance, according to Ashworth, 
Boyne and Delbridge.[67] However, convergence is manifest in 
the discourses and main goals of different Latin American 
national plans and even policy mechanisms/instruments, quite 
similar, while formal structures may vary more from country 
to country,[58,96] though also following a continuous movement 
in terms of a direction consistent with the isomorphic pressures (i.e., 
compliance).
This subtlety is important because it shows what is happening 
in peripheral cases. Furthermore, to a significant degree, what 
is happening is a high level of conformity and, to a lesser extent, 
convergence.[67] Apparently, in Latin America, for example, 
more than a policy learning – that ‘occurs when policy-makers 
adjust their cognitive understanding and modify policy in the 
light of knowledge gained from past policy experience’[45] – 
what is happening is a policy transfer. An extensive diffusion of 
policy ideas, programmes and, more recently, what seems to 
be an acritical adoption of so-called ‘best practices.’
This concurs with what we have found throughout history: i.e., 
the development of imitative policies has been a typical feature 
of these regions. Moreover, following this modus operandi, one 
might view the advancement of innovation policies in the 
last two decades as the only possible model, which also seems 
to be the assumption of a ‘single thought’[6] in the S&T area. 
That came to mean the predominance of instrumental reason 
dominating the realm of economic policy, which includes 
the subsuming of several historical dimensions on the scope of 
STI policy motivations (e.g., university, knowledge creation, 
culture) and – in what appears to be happening in the face 
of the hegemonic of Neochumpterian readings –, alienating 
endogenous traditions of thought.
As expected, when one raises the isomorphism debate, 
despite the existing literature and the empirical examples we 
have discussed, many STIP actors naturally reject the idea of 
merely replicating discourses or theories from abroad. Others 
(including scholars) prefer to stress national characteristics. 
of innovation as a panacea or picturing innovation as a hope 
discourse.[71]
The ‘key apparatuses’ of the ‘pro-innovation’ rationale in 
S&T policies have been based on endless reports, indexes, 
scoreboards, databases, development outlooks, cluster plans, 
training courses, a ‘best practices’ rhetoric that guide science 
policy formulation and implementation at our present time. 
Performative and usually anonymous documentation that 
ultimately have the purpose of making stakeholders aware 
of the interests in favour of opening the administration 
(including the scientific infrastructure) to the pressures of 
economic forces.
This overview on Latin American STIP reveals not just 
a ‘pro-innovation’ bias but also a change in its paradigm, 
from promoting techno-scientific development (based on 
infrastructure) to a “pro-innovation” one based on the market 
and techno-innovative enterprises,[95] accompanied by a 
substantial increase (but not catching with the developed 
countries) regarding the financial resources for the science, 
technology and innovation area. All the STI area interests 
took advantage of this relative growth of resources when 
the innovation rhetoric got the political and public spheres’ 
attention. However, the amount of resources involved and 
the proportion of R&D funded by the government in these 
countries still varies significantly; results regarding a structural 
change in these countries’ political economy are very mild. 
In 2018, for example, five countries were responsible for 87% 
of the Iberoamerican Gross Expenditure on R&D (GERD) 
(RICYT): Brazil, Spain, Mexico, Argentina and Portugal.
FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
Following Latin American countries (and having in mind 
the Iberian countries in the European periphery), it is easy to 
observe a similarity in the political and technocratic discourses 
and with the adopted institutional and policy settings. When 
one accepts a global perspective, it is indisputable that there is 
a good measure of similarity in discourses and policies. 
In none of these countries, this ‘pro-innovation orientation’ 
was just a symbolic and discursive turn. There is on-going 
materiality in this process due to historical background and 
trajectories, shaping institutions, programmatic documents, 
policy mechanisms, funding options, etc., moulding a 
strategic thought and an innovation discourse pervasive 
to all areas, supported and legitimized by international 
organizations’ recommendations. International authority, 
then, aims to promote the desired effect in policy milieus, 
being instrumental in persuading courses of action.[53] This 
approach to policy formulation and implementation based 
on the appeal of models, supported by discourses[26] and 
frameworks,[22] engenders a process of ‘isomorphism’[27,28] on 
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Superior Council of Scientific Researches]; ECLA: Economic 
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Fondo Nacional de Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación [ES - 
National Fund for Science, Technology and Innovation]; 
FONTAR: Fondo Tecnológico Argentino [ES - Argentine 
Technological Fund]; GERD: Gross Expenditure on R&D; 
IBD: Inter-American Bank of Development; JAE: Junta 
para Ampliación de Estudios e Investigaciones Científica [ES 
- Board for Expansion of Studies and Scientific Researches]; 
JEN: Junta de Educação Nacional [PT - National Education 
Board]; JNICT: Junta Nacional de Investigação Científica 
e Tecnológica [PT - National Board of Scientific and 
Technological Research]; MICITEC: Ministerio de Ciencia, 
Tecnología, Conocimiento e Innovación [ES - Ministry of 
Science, Technology, Knowledge and Innovation]; NIS: 
National Innovation System; OAS: Organization of American 
States; OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development; R&D: Research and Development; 
RICYT: Ibero-American and Inter-American Network of 
Science and Technology; S&T: Science and Technology; 
STI / ST&I:  Science, Technology and Innovation; STIP: 
Science, Technology and Innovation Policy; UN: United 
Nations; UNESCO: United Nations Education, Scientific, 
and Cultural Organisation.
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(ENDNOTES)
1. < https://www.ani.pt/en/ >
2. The Ibero-American and Inter-American Network for Science and Technology 
Indicators (RICYT) was created following a proposal outlined in the First Ibero-
American Workshop for Science and Technology Indicators, held in Argentina 
in 1994. All the American countries, as well as Spain and Portugal, participate 
in RICYT. Today, its primary support is the Ibero-American States Organization 
(OEI), through the Observatory for Science, Technology and Society. RICYT 
takes part as observer in the NESTI Group of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD). Besides, RICYT works jointly with the 
UNESCO Institute for Statistics, the Interamerican Development Bank (IADB), 
the Economic Commission for Latin-America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
among other institutions.
3. < http://www.sofinnova.com/ >.
4. <http://www.meti.go.jp/english/apec/apec-isti/ISTI/abridge/jpz/jpzsme03.htm 
>.
5. < http://www.finep.gov.br/ >.
6. < http://www.agencia.mincyt.gob.ar/frontend/agencia/fondo/fontar >. 
7. < http://www.corfo.cl/inicio >
8. < http://fonacit.gob.ve/ >
9. < https://www.minciencia.gob.cl/ >.
10. < https://www.anid.cl/historia// >.
11. Bagattolli et al. (2016) present a more detailed account of the impact of inter-
national organizations on the STIP of Iberoamerican.
